Carnap, Feyerabend and the pragmatic theory of observation by Kuby, Daniel




Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of ob-
servation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists
during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the
systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observa-
tion can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel
a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas Oberdan. Fol-
lowing Morris’ and Carnap’s documented usage, I show that the intended meaning
of “pragmatic” refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and
their environment describable by empirical means (specifically, the causal relation be-
tween the verbal behavior of language users and their environment). I reconstruct such
a pragmatic theory in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences
as bodily dispositions indicating physical events in the surroundings of the detector.
I then proceed to show how Feyerabend’s later theory of observation picks up cen-
tral features of Carnap’s account and also shares some of the motivations. I conclude
by noting how an empirical theory of observation sentences offers a bootstrapping
solution to the “basis problem”.
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1. Introduction
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Paul Feyerabendmade waves in the philosophy of science
community by advancing a number of sweeping proposals, among them a radical version of
the theory-ladenness of observation and the incommensurability-thesis (Feyerabend 1958;
Feyerabend 1962). While theory-ladenness and incommensurability were hotly debated by
other contemporaries and became stock in the history of philosophy of science (not least
because some versions were advocated by other notable philosophers (Hanson 1958; Kuhn
1962) and could be traced back in history (Duhem 1906)), a third incisive proposal by Fey-
erabend, the so-called Pragmatic Theory of Observation (PTO) first published in his (1958),
has not become a classical topic. Various explanations are readily available: seemingly no
other ‘post-positivist’ philosopher of science advocated it and it has been discussed mostly
dismissively ever since (Butts 1966; Townsend 1970; Hull 1972).1 Also, the conceptual
resources used to articulate PTO are chiefly rooted in the statement view. While incom-
1Important exceptions are Grover Maxwell’s classic paper “On the ontological status of theoretical enti-
ties”, in which PTO appeared briefly as the conception of “quickly decidable sentences” (Maxwell 1962, 13);
and the early Bas van Fraassen (cf. his (1992)), who inherited a cognate account from Wilfrid Sellars and
was sympathetic to PTO. (This was confirmed to me by van Fraassen in personal communication.) A clear
account of PTO in Feyerabend scholarship is given by Oberheim (2006).
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mensurability and theory-ladenness could be discussed even after its abandonment, PTO
apparently could not.
Though PTO has not been passed down ‘internally’, it has been introduced into the histor-
ical discussion by Oberdan (1990), who evaluates PTO in a historical perspective and is
cited ever since (see for example Preston 1997, 45–50, 214; Oberheim 2006, 233; Misak
1995, 80, 202; Olegario da Silva, Gilson 2013, 155–6). In this paper I want to revive the
conversation in the HOPOS community. The setting of this discussion is quite interesting.
In his (1962), Feyerabend not only advances PTO, but also sketches a genealogy, tracing
the idea of a “pragmatic” theory of observation back to Logical Empiricism—a notable
circumstance, given the very critical attitude with regard to the received view of Logical
Empiricism for which he is generally known. However, from the vantage point of an histor-
ical appraisal of Feyerabend’s formative years, this claim doesn’t come as a surprise. The
background thesis of the present paper, not developed here any further, is that Feyerabend’s
philosophical coming-of-age took place within the context of scientific philosophy—and
Logical Empiricism in particular.2 In this sense, a historically sound interpretation of Fey-
erabend’s philosophy and its development can only be had by taking into account our best
knowledge of the history of scientific philosophy.3
Furthermore, Feyerabend’s claim doubles his role: PTOmakes him an historical protagonist
and, at the same time, he becomes an historical commentator of PTO. It is the latter role that
has been taken up by Oberdan (1990), who advances a critique of Feyerabend’s historical
2See Stadler (2010), Kuby (2010), also Yuann (2007). The most detailed missing link, Feyerabend’s
unpublished dissertation Zur Theorie der Basissätze (1951), is still unpublished, but other textual evidence
has surfaced in the meantime: Feyerabend ([1951] 2010), Feyerabend ([1948] 2016); see Kuby, Limbeck-
Lilienau, and Schorner (2010), Kuby (2016) for commentary.
3Logical Empiricism is but one of many attempts at the creation of a “scientific philosophy”. The term is
used here to denote a philosophy which self-identifies with an orientation towards the sciences. The question
how this orientation should be understood and the kind of “scientification” of philosophy it engenders has been
answered very differently by different strains within the tradition of scientific philosophy (see Richardson
1997).
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contention that the development of PTO can be traced back to Logical Empiricism, espe-
cially to Rudolf Carnap. In his critique, Oberdan claims that Feyerabend misunderstood
Carnap’s view on protocol sentences, and, more specifically, that the latter never held the
particular characterization of observation sentences that Feyerabend ascribes to him, to wit,
a “pragmatic” account of observation sentences.4 Contrary to this reading, I advance the
claim that Feyerabend’s actual usage of the expression “pragmatic” matches an interesting
proposal about protocol sentences emerging in the protocol sentence debate of the early
1930s, particularly in Carnap’s writings.
If an historical appreciation of Logical Empiricism is necessary to interpret Feyerabend’s
philosophy, conversely, I think that Feyerabend can help the systematic study of Logical
Empiricism in HOPOS scholarship. The present paper is a first attempt at a vindication
of this claim, focusing on a neglected result of the Vienna Circle’s discussions, and recon-
structing a pragmatic characterization of observation as can be found in Carnap’s writings
of 1932.
I will proceed as follows: I first argue that Oberdan’s critiquemisses themark, as it misreads
Feyerabend’s use of “pragmatic” in the context of PTO and, as a consequence, incorrectly
tracks the genealogy claimed by Feyerabend. I argue that Feyerabend’s actual usage of
the expression “pragmatic”—following Morris’ definition, and as synonym for “causal”—
gives a more adequate interpretation of what PTO is about. I argue that Feyerabend refers
4Oberdan makes a further, more interesting objection, which cannot be addressed here due to limitations
of space. According to Oberdan, Feyerabend’s characterization of observation sentences has a universal
pretension, which is alien to Carnap’s language-relative outlook: “For Feyerabend specified pragmatic (in-
cluding causal) criteria for observation reports that are independent of any interpretation they might receive
in a given language. Then the criterion of observationality transcends the limits of any given theoretical
framework, yielding universal criteria for distinguishing observation reports. Of course, the very notion of
universal criteria […] is alien to Carnap’s conception” (Oberdan 1990, 30–31). A brief comment: since Feyer-
abend’s causal account of observation sentences closely matches Carnap’s account in this regard, either such
a universal pretension in Carnap’s account has gone unnoticed (after all, the account precedes his adoption of
the tolerance principle)—or the kind of universal pretension ascribed to Feyerabend can’t possibly be correct.
I tend to the latter.
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to an overlooked empirical characterization of protocol sentences to be found in Carnap’s
writings of 1932. Noting the traditional view of Carnap as interested chiefly in logical mat-
ters, I contextualize this synthetic, empirical account within the protocol sentence debate
(§2). In the subsequent section I give a detailed reconstruction of such an empirical char-
acterization of protocol sentences as can be found in Carnap’s Erkenntnis articles of 1932,
working out what I call the detector model of observation (or protocol) sentences (§3). I
then go back to sketch some of the most obvious lessons Feyerabend adopted from Car-
nap’s proposal (§4) and conclude my exposition by commenting on the pragmatic account
of observation sentences as a solution to the “basis problem” (§5).
2. Setting the stage: An empirical account of the empirical
basis of science
2.1 Feyerabend’s and Carnap’s notion of “pragmatic”
Let’s first introduce Oberdan’s account of PTO, according to which PTO is composed of
“two ideas”: “The first is that observation reports are ‘theory-laden’ in the sense that they are
always interpreted in the light of the best current theory and are subject to reinterpretation
when one theory succeeds another”5 (Oberdan 1990, 25).
According to Oberdan, “Feyerabend finds that the theory-ladenness of observation leads
inexorably to the second idea of the Pragmatic Theory”, namely, that “what counts as an
observation report does not depend on either its empirical content or its logical form, but
on its causal or pragmatic features” (Oberdan 1990, 25).6
5Though Oberdan does not give any references to Feyerabend’s work, this is clearly a paraphrase of
Feyerabend’s “thesis I” first presented in 1958: […] [T]he interpretation of an observation language is
determined by the theories that we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those
theories change. (Feyerabend 1958, 163)
6Notably, Oberdan agrees with the—in my view much more contentious—claim that the “first idea”
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For the sake of argument, we will work with Oberdan’s summary of PTO and, by doing
so, overlook the problematic nature of this account, in order to address his main contention:
“[T]he function Carnap allotted to pragmatic factors in the discrimination of observation
reports is nothing like what Feyerabend has in mind. Then it cannot be said that Carnap
endorsed the second idea of the Pragmatic Theory in anything like the sense in which Fey-
erabend intended. These considerations suffice to show that Feyerabend’s historical con-
tentions about Carnap’s early philosophy are false” (Oberdan 1990, 25).
What did Carnap have in mind that Feyerabend did not?
Oberdan interprets the expression “pragmatic” as referring to Carnap’s famous convention-
alized understanding of language expressed in his Principle of Tolerance.7 In Oberdan’s
words: “The choice of a language is independent of objective matters of fact so that only
pragmatic considerations guide the decision to adopt a given form of language” (Oberdan
1990, 29, emphasis added). Oberdan then tries to give a charitable reading of the work that
the Principle can do for a “pragmatic” theory of observation: the application of the Principle
to the problem of characterizing the observation language yields the conclusion that “there
is no absolute class of observational sentences, fixed once and for all time […]. Rather,
distinguishing certain statements as observational is part of determining the specifics of a
language. Since these matters are conventional, they ultimately turn on pragmatic consid-
erations and, in this limited sense, Carnap’s account may be termed ‘pragmatic’ ” (Oberdan
1990, 29, emphasis added).
But even admitting this, Oberdan argues, a pragmatic theory of observation sentences,
as Feyerabend would have it, does not follow. More specifically, Oberdan’s first charge
of Feyerabend’s PTO, the theory-ladenness of observation as expressed in thesis I, can indeed be found in
Carnap as a natural consequence of his Metalogic Thesis: “Since the meaning of statements are given by
their inferential relations to other statements, this last conclusion [i.e. that two sentences are regarded as
inferentially related whenever current theory vindicates the conclusion of one from the other] is tantamount to
the Pragmatic Theory’s notion that observation reports are to be translated in light of contemporary scientific
thought” (Oberdan 1990, 27).
7See Carnap (1934a, sec. 17).
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against Feyerabend is one of omission: Feyerabend negligently ignores the linguistic back-
ground of Carnap’s “pragmatism”, thus misconstruing Carnap’s conventionalism.
A very basic observation shows Oberdan’s charge to be misplaced: Feyerabend’s use of
“pragmatic” doesn’t refer at all to Carnap’s conventionalism. Feyerabend’s theory is not
“pragmatic” in the sense that it refers to external framework questions.8 Anticipating my
result in Carnap’s parlance: Feyerabend’s PTO is a theoretical proposal. The “pragmatic”
component in it doesn’t refer to the external determination of the specifics of a language,
but to a specific result of such a determination. In other words, Feyerabend’s genealogical
claim doesn’t refer to Carnap’s contributions to metaphilosophy, but to the content of one
of Carnap’s early language proposals.
Feyerabend makes his understanding of “pragmatic” explicit in the very paper Oberdan crit-
icizes. Commenting on passages by Popper and Carnap allegedly indicating their ‘retreat
from experience’, Feyerabend introduces the terminology thus: “Now it is most important
to realize that the characterization of observation statements implicit in the above quotations
is a causal characterization, or if one wants to use more recent terminology, a pragmatic
characterization” (Feyerabend 1962, 36). The first glaring hint is that “pragmatic” is in-
troduced as synonym for “causal” (not “conventional”). Further, Feyerabend introduces
the word “pragmatic” to conform to a “more recent terminology”, which is spelled out in
the footnote, where Morris’ Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938), in particular his
definition of “pragmatics”, is referenced.
Famously, “pragmatics” is a technical term introducing a third “dimension of semiosis”
(Morris 1938, 30) alongside syntax and semantics: “By ‘pragmatics’ is designated the sci-
8This is not to say that PTO is not also “pragmatic” in Oberdan’s sense. In fact, Feyerabend claims ex-
plicitly that the epistemic status of PTO is that of a convention: “The choice between the pragmatic theory
[of observation] and the semantic theory [of observation] is of course purely a matter of convention” (Fey-
erabend 1965b, 243). It is a question of choice, not truth. But this further claim, the conventional nature of
PTO, is not the reason Feyerabend labels his theory of observation as “pragmatic”. (To be sure, Feyerabend’s
understanding of “choice” differs from Carnap’s in that it involves axiological considerations that seem to go
beyond and above Carnap’s limited instrumental considerations. But this is a topic for another paper.)
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ence of the relation of signs to their interpreters. ‘Pragmatics’ must then be distinguished
from ‘pragmatism,’ and ‘pragmatical’ from ‘pragmatic.’ Sincemost, if not all, signs have as
their interpreters living organisms, it is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmat-
ics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological,
biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs” (Morris
1938, 30).
Pragmatics and cognates were not always used by Morris to separate the realm of pragmat-
ics from syntax and semantics. Sometimes pragmatics denotes the whole field of semiotics.
On other occasions pragmatics has a more narrow meaning, denoting only the linguistic
sub-discipline.9 Feyerabend’s characterization strongly suggests that he uses it in the first,
differentiating sense. In this limited sense Morris can help us to understand Feyerabend’s
notion of pragmatics, but there’s no evidence that Feyerabend’s terminological choice im-
plies a commitment to Morris’s overall semiotic program.
Not so in Carnap’s case. Morris’ tripartitionwas proposed as a systematic framework for the
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science and Carnap adopted it quite readily in his
own contribution (Carnap [1939] 1957). As defined by Carnap, “pragmatics is an empirical
discipline dealing with a special kind of human behavior and making use of the results of
the different branches of science (principally social science, but also physics, biology and
psychology)” (Carnap [1939] 1957, 6). Pragmatics is concerned with “the action, state, and
environment of a man who speaks or hears” (Carnap [1939] 1957, 4). It studies “the mode
of use” of expressions and “both the cause and the effect” of utterances in social contexts.
It is most important to notice that the field of pragmatics is in noway coincident with the Car-
napian realm of external questions.10 To the contrary, the questions addressed in pragmatics
are theoretical, not practical. Carnap’s life-long dichotomy between theoretical and practi-
9See Uebel (2013) on this point.
10This is true for Carnap’s understanding. As Uebel (2013, 530–1) notes, this does not hold for the very
wide meaning of pragmatics occasionally used by Morris, which included axiological considerations, moral-
political discourse as ‘humanistic implications of semiotics’.
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cal questions prevented him from ever equating “pragmatical” and “practical”. Pragmatical
questions are internal questions of the discipline of pragmatics asking for a descriptive an-
swer; practical questions are external questions in need of a volitional decision.11 Thus,
when Carnap characterizes something as “pragmatical”, he refers to its empirical character,
not to its conventional or volitional nature.12
The same holds for Feyerabend’s use of “pragmatic”. Applied to the characterization of
observation sentences, “pragmatic” advertises the circumstance that the observational char-
acter is spelled out in terms of the relation between observation sentences (a class of signs)
and observers (a class of interpreters), as opposed to the formal relations between sentences
(syntax), or the relations between observation sentences and what is observed (semantics).
Feyerabend’s earlier designation—“pragmatic” is introduced as a synonym for “causal”—
specifies the kind of relation that PTO establishes between observation sentences and ob-
servers: a causal relation.
Oberdan’s second charge is that Feyerabend’s PTO cannot possibly be a consequence of
Carnap’s conventionalism:
If Carnap’s account of observation is pragmatic, its pragmatism is nonetheless
conditioned by the principles of his philosophy of language. If the conven-
tional choice of a language is broadly construed as the choice of a framework
of justification, and only pragmatic considerations can influence this choice,
11See also Uebel (2013), p. 540 on this point.
12Complicating the interpretation somewhat, Morris stipulates the adjectival form to be used when refer-
ring to the field on inquiry (“pragmatical”), in order to distinguish it from features pertaining to practical
considerations (“pragmatic”). When denoting the former, Carnap followed Morris’ terminology down to this
specific recommendation, while Feyerabend did not. (Doing so would have probably avoided the misunder-
standing present in Oberdan’s paper.) On the other hand, the “pragmatical”-“pragmatic” distinction is not
readily available in German: where Carnap used “pragmatisch” in Logische Syntax, he himself suggested
“pragmatical” (first choice) or “pragmatic” (second choice) in the English translation (cf. Quine and Carnap
(1991), p. 275). And, contrary to Morris, he consistently continued to render “praktisch” as “practical”, not
“pragmatic”.
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then the decision to count certain sentences as observational is likewise a prag-
matic issue. But Feyerabend attributes Carnap the further conclusion that ob-
servation reports are not distinguished by their contents, but by their causes;
certain utterances are observation reports because their etiology conforms to
certain patterns of behavior. Thus Feyerabend further misconstrues Carnap’s
conventionalism with respect to protocols as if it implied that “an observation
sentence is distinguished from other sentences of a theory not by its content but
by the cause of its production, by the fact that its production conforms to cer-
tain behavioral patterns.” (Feyerabend 1962, 36) But this last notion, the idea
that observation reports are pragmatically distinguished in the sense that their
demarcation depends on their causal features, is a far cry from what Carnap
had in mind when he granted pragmatic factors a role in the isolation of obser-
vation reports from other scientific statements. (Oberdan 1990, 30, emphasis
mine)
I agree with Oberdan that the two notions are “a far cry” from each other. But neither the
following charge holds: Feyerabend does not misconstrue Carnap’s conventionalism and
he does not claim that it implies PTO, because he does not refer to Carnap’s framework con-
ventionalism in the first place—and thus cannot possibly claim the inference that Oberdan
attributes to him. PTO is not a “further conclusion” of Carnap’s framework conventional-
ism. It is—in Carnap’s parlance—a particular proposal. And this proposal, so Feyerabend
claims, Carnap (first) put forward.13 Having established a charitable interpretation of Fey-
erabend’s notion of a “pragmatic” theory of observation, it is this claim that ought to be
carefully checked.14
13In chapter II of Oberdan (1993), in particular the section “The pragmatics of protocols”, Oberdan gives
a clear account of Carnap’s Metalogic and how this conception yielded a pragmatic account of protocol sen-
tences, which makes his misunderstanding of Feyerabend the more puzzling.
14Oberdan frames the correctness of this claim as crucial to Feyerabend’s own philosophical aims:
[A]lthough the purpose behind Feyerabend’s explanations is to discredit the later Positivist account of ob-
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2.2 Feyerabend on the development of empiricism in the 1930s
In his (1962), Feyerabend sets the task of “free[ing]” contemporary empiricism from “the
elements which it still shares with its more dogmatic opponents”, paving the way for a
“disinfected empiricism”. But, in an unexpected narrative turn, he warns us that this isn’t
an original achievement for already “the empiricism of the thirties was disinfected in the
sense desired here” (Feyerabend 1962, 31). Judging from his subsequent references, it
is evident that he refers to Viennese Logical Empiricism and (what today is known as) the
protocol sentence debate.15 Feyerabend sketches a radical development of empiricism from
the “earlier positivism of the Vienna Circle” (Feyerabend 1962, 31) leading up to the debate:
“[S]ince these happy and carefree days of the Aufbau, logical empiricism has been greatly
modified. The changes that took place were mainly of two kinds. On the one side, new
ideas were introduced concerning the relation between observational terms and theoretical
terms. On the other side, the assumptions made about the observational language itself
were modified. In both cases the changes were quite drastic” (Feyerabend 1962, 34–35).16
servation, the ultimate success of [Feyerabend’s] systematic program depends on the historical thesis that
Carnap endorsed the fundamental tenet of the Pragmatic Theory in his Thirties’ writings on protocols (Ober-
dan 1990, 25). This seems to me a non-sequitur. The “ultimate success” of Feyerabend’s systematic program
is not dependent on what Carnap endorsed at a particular time or not. Suppose e.g. that the “ultimate success”
of Feyerabend’s systematic program rests on the consistency of PTO; surely the consistency of PTO is not
dependent on whether someone else held it or not. It may be the case that Feyerabend’s critique of (the re-
ceived view of) Logical Empiricism—only where it takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum argument—is
dependent upon the premises actually held by the argumentative opponent, but certainly any such reductio
ad absurdum is not identifiable with Feyerabend’s systematic program (at least for any reasonable definition
of “systematic program”, i.e. entailing the advance of some affirmative claims).
15See Oberdan (1993), Uebel (2007) for detailed historical and systematic reconstructions of the protocol
sentence debate.
16In this development Feyerabend (1962, 35–36) records a number of steps that, according to him, led
to a pragmatic account of observation sentences: 1) “The early positivists assumed that observational terms
refer to subjective impressions, sensations, and perceptions of some sentient being.” (No references given,
but Carnap (1928) is mentioned beforehand.) 2) “Physicalism for some time retained the idea that a scientific
11
To be sure, Feyerabend is not doing history of philosophy of science (“for our present pur-
pose a brief outline must suffice” (Feyerabend 1962, 35) indeed) and it would be an hollow
exercise tomeasure the correctness of his passing remarks from the vantage point of contem-
porary historical studies. In a later paper, he would stress again and even more sweepingly
the supposed origin of PTO: “The new theory of observability […] ([…] which was for-
mulated very clearly in the early thirties by Popper, Carnap and Neurath) may be called
the pragmatic theory of observation)” (Feyerabend 1965b, 243). Yet the wide range of
diverging views in the Viennese debate makes it difficult to ascribe a common theory to Car-
nap, Neurath and Popper.17 All the same, Feyerabend’s narrative in his (1962) is specific
enough to pinpoint some features of the radical development he cherished.
The background to Feyerabend’s narrative is the steady radicalization of Carnap’s and Neu-
rath’s views in their mutual interaction since the publication of Carnap’s Aufbau in Vienna
(and, starting 1931, between Prague and Vienna), leading to the formulation of syntacticism
and physicalism. The tipping point starting this development, as told by Carnap himself,
theory should be based upon experiences, and that the ultimate constituents of experience were sensations,
impressions, and perceptions.” (Referenced: Carnap (1932d)) 3) “Later, however, a behavioristic account
was given of these perceptions to make them accessible to intersubjective testing. Such a theory was held,
for some time, by Carnap and Neurath.” (Referenced: Carnap (1932d)) 4) “Soon afterwards the idea that
it is experiences to which we must refer when trying to interpret our observation statements was altogether
abandoned” and “Popper […] has been responsible for this decisive turn”. (Referenced: Popper (1959)) 5)
“The descriptive terms of Carnap’s”thing-language,” too, no longer refer to experiences.” (References: Car-
nap (1936), Carnap (1937)) Cf. the similarity and differences to the reconstruction in (Uebel 2007, 442):
Carnap1: the evidential statements concerned, at the bottom, recollections of similarity relations between
experiences. Carnap2: the primitive protocol statements were statements about the phenomenal given vari-
ously describable. Carnap3: the protocol statements were statements about the given that could take various
phenomenalistic or non-phenomenalistic forms. Carnap4: the protocol statements referred to concrete physi-
cal states of affairs: psychological states, observed processes or unobserved processes inferred from observed
processes. Carnap5: the protocol statements referred to observable physical states.
17In a letter to Kuhn in the early 1960s Feyerabend mentions Carnap only: “By the way, a theory which
would allow such procedure has been sketched, in 1932, by Carnap himself and I have discussed it under the
title of “the pragmatic theory of experience” in my explanation essay (1962)” (Hoyningen-Huene 1995, 383).
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coincides with the opposition of some members of the Vienna Circle to Wittgenstein’s view
that one cannot talk about language:
In opposition to this view, first tentatively, then more and more clearly, our
conception developed that it is possible to talk meaningfully about language
and about the relation between a sentence and the fact described. Neurath em-
phasized from the beginning that language phenomena are events within the
world, not something that refers to the world from outside. Spoken language
consists of sound waves; written language consists of marks of ink on paper.
Neurath emphasized these facts in order to reject the view that there is some-
thing “higher”, something mysterious, “spiritual”, in language, a view which
was prominent in German philosophy. I agreed with him, but pointed out that
only the structural pattern, not the physical properties of the ink marks, were
relevant for the function of language. Thus it is possible to construct a theory
about language, namely the geometry of the written pattern. This idea led later
to the theory which I called “logical syntax” of language. (Schilpp 1963, 29)
Behind Carnap’s idea of a “geometry of the written pattern” lies his adoption of the formal
viewpoint of the Hilbert school, according to which a logical language is a system of unin-
terpreted marks rather than meaningful signs. Carnap extended this viewpoint to all knowl-
edge in general. A series of results in mathematical logic aided Carnap’s contention that
is was possible to speak about the object-language in the meta-language and, then, object-
language.18 This paved the way for Carnap’s Thesis of Metalogic, already previewed in
(Carnap 1932a, 435), that “all philosophical problems which have any meaning belong to
syntax” (Carnap [1937] 2014, 280), i.e. all meaningful philosophical sentences are sen-
tences about the form of sentences. Applied to the notion of observation, the Thesis states
that “philosophical conceptions about the nature of observation are, properly expressed,
opinions about the syntactic analysis of the statements describing observations” (Oberdan
18See Awodey and Carus (2006) for a detailed reconstruction of this development.
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1993, 10).
As we will see, Carnap’s distinction between “structural pattern” and the “physical proper-
ties of the ink marks” of written language downplays the role that language as a system of
physical (spoken, written) events played in his own work. While for Carnap the physical
properties of ink marks may not play a role in spelling out the linguistic (logical) function
of those ink marks (as they did in Neurath’s project of “physicalization of metalinguistic
discourse”, cf. Uebel (2007), p.164-165), they become relevant where their empirical role
is key to clarify epistemological issues.
While Carnap’s project of logical syntax is often taken to be coincident with the former
(logical) option, the latter (empirical) option is mostly associated with the work of Otto
Neurath. In the case of Carnap this holds de facto—Carnap concerned himself mostly with
the logical—but not in principle. For one thing, empirical questions hardly vanished from
Carnap’s writings. While his analysis is often remembered for exposing traditional philo-
sophical questions as meaningless pseudo-questions, it was not its only outcome. Some
meaningful questions turned out to have an analytic and a synthetic component, which had
to be carefully disentangled. The former were to be treated as problems of logical syntax,
the latter in terms of physicalization. Traditional problems were thus not simply annulled,
but dissolved intoWissenschaftslogik plus a realwissenschaftliches part. The problem of
the empirical foundation of science (the “basis problem”) was one of such questions that
turned out to have both components. And on various occasions during the protocol sentence
debate—without doubt due to Neurath’s influence—Carnap not only acknowledged the syn-
thetic component, but also elaborated on it.19 The causal characterization of observation
sentences, which Feyerabend found congenial, is located in this empirical realm. Indeed, I
judge it to be Carnap’s most perceptive and detailed analysis pushing in this direction.
19Carus (2007, 166) dates the origin of this development already to a much earlier time: “From some time
in 1924, the aspects of the system that had begun under the auspices of phenomenology were transformed
either into empirical statements about the workings of the sensory organs or into explicit statements of meta-
logic, later called rules of ‘logical syntax’.”
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In the following, I will focus on what Thomas Uebel calls “phase two” of the protocol sen-
tence debate, in particular on substages two and three (cf. Uebel (2007), ch. 7 and 8).20
Temporally, this timeframe coincides with the publication of key writings by Carnap (and
Neurath) in the 1932 protocol sentence debate. I will limit myself mostly to textual evidence
from Carnap’s major articles of this phase: Primarily, Carnap’s paper “Die physikalische
Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft” (1932a).21 As is well known, Universal-
sprache contains the first exposition of physicalism as the thesis that firstly, the language
of science, because of its intersubjective nature, coincides with the physical language; sec-
ondly, that the physical language is a universal language of science; thirdly, that the proto-
col language is a sub-language of the physical language.
The very general remarks of Universalsprache were flanked by more specific and applied
investigations, in particular about how physicalism could be carried out in the case of psy-
chology. A decisive push in this direction was surely given by Neurath. As early as 1928,
responding in a letter to Neurath’s review of his (1928), Carnap emphatically acknowl-
edged that the actual scientific language is always a “mixture of crystals and dirt” and that
one ought to think hard about “what demands are to be made of scientific concepts and
statements while the ‘ideal language’ is not available”, announcing that “a few ideas in
this direction are already beginning to form …” (Carnap to Neurath, 7 October 1928, p. 1,
RC 029-16-01, cited in Carus (2007), p. 240). Following up on his intention to pursue
this line of inquiry, Carnap approached the “ ‘dirty’ subject of psychology”, a domain that
had already attracted his attention (Carus 2007, 240). The published outcome was his “Psy-
20Uebel (2007) has worked out in detail how the protocol sentence debate came about, dividing the Vienna
Circle discussions into three stages and more refined substages. “Proto-physicalism” emerged in phase two,
substage one; substage two and three saw the emergence of mature physicalism, first as a theoretical assertion,
then as a proposal, in line with Carnap’s looming Principle of Tolerance.
21The English translation Carnap (1934b) is bad (which is ironic since the translation effort was aided by
Carnap). Based on the German original, I will provide heavily modified translations and give page references
to both.
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chologie in physikalischer Sprache” (1932c),22 exercising physicalism in the particular case
of then current psychological approaches.23 The other major paper, “Über Protokollsätze”
(1932d),24 follows up the discussion of the “basis problem” and is well-known in the context
of the protocol sentence debate. Lastly, the subsequent “Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden
Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K. Duncker” (1932b) contains a discussion of two critical replies
Carnap had received. Firstly, Edgar Zilsel’s reply to “Über Protokollsätze”; and, secondly,
a reply by Gestalt psychologist K. Duncker to “Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache”.
I do not claim that it is necessary, or even possible, to discern a chronological development
through the writings towards a causal characterization of observation sentences. Rather, I
claim that a basic causal characterization is a common denominator of these articles; and
each article provides key ingredients towards a fuller pragmatic theory. The following ac-
count is then meant as a synchronic snapshot. Similarly, limiting my reconstruction to
Carnap’s writings may reduce the evidential weight of my analysis, but I think that by and
large Carnap distills in the 1932 articles most of the features that Neurath and Popper con-
tributed towards a pragmatic characterization of observation sentences.25 In 1932, Popper’s,
Carnap’s and Neurath’s views converge in their rejection of the absolutism of “the given”.
Alternatively, all three either preferred or demanded sentences referring to medium-sized
objects and events. At the same time, their rejection of “the given” correlated with an
anti-foundationalist view of protocol sentences accepting their corrigibility and revisabil-
ity. Specifically, protocols statements are not generally binding, their acceptance being
contingent on further conditions and decisions.26
22I will use the translation provided in Carnap (1959).
23See Feest (2017) on the psychological research background of Carnap’s work.
24I will use the very good translation provided in Carnap (1987).
25This does not imply that they agreed on the background motivations for these common views. The
conventionalist element was variously embedded inNeurath’s naturalism, Carnap’s syntacticism and Popper’s
Neo-kantian framing.
26From here their paths variously intersect and diverge: Carnap agreed with Neurath that sentence-
formation is a legitimate part of the “basis problem” to be explicated in terms of a relational characteriza-
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From these assumptions the claim I want to defend is twofold:
1) From the vantage point of Carnap’s radical blend of syntacticism and physicalism,
protocol sentences are not discernible in terms of syntax, and, therefore, there is
no logical distinction between protocol sentences and system sentences in principle.
This does not mean, however, that protocol sentences cannot be characterized at all.
The syntactical indiscernibility view is simply a consequence of a specific way in
which the analytic and the synthetic components of the problem of the empirical basis
of science were disentangled. In Carnap’s analysis, the characterization of protocol
sentences is not a logical, but an empirical task: protocol sentences are discernible
qua physicalization. Incidentally, this seems to me the reason why the syntactical
indiscernibility view was not perceived by Carnap as a threatening consequence: an
empirical characterization is characterization enough.
2) The specific result sketched in (1) is what Feyerabend refers to when he claims that a
pragmatic or causal theory of observation can be found in “thewritings of the thirties”.
In particular, Feyerabend’s view that “an observation sentence is distinguished from
other sentences of a theory not by its content, but by the cause of its production” (Fey-
erabend 1962, 36) matches the view that protocol sentences cannot be distinguished
from system sentences logically, but they can be distinguished empirically.
The next two sections will be devoted to justifying these claims. In doing so, I will mainly
tion between an organism’s utterances and its surroundings (cf. Carnap’s “B-sentence” (Carnap 1934b, 92,
revised translation; cf. Carnap 1932a, 460; also Carnap 1959, revised translation, p. 92; cf. Carnap 1932c,
139). Popper, on the other hand, rejected these (empirical) considerations as “psychologistic”. On this point
Feyerabend clearly takes side with Carnap and Neurath against Popper. But, while Neurath explicitly cod-
ified this “sensory condition” in his idiosyncratic sentence acceptance schema, Carnap went with Popper’s
less regimented requirements for protocol sentences, which where no longer restricted in their syntactic form,
which Feyerabend also took to heart. (See Uebel 2007 for an exhaustive reconstruction of these dynamics.)
A more detailed consideration of the specific features and limits of Neurath’s and Popper’s contributions
to a causal theory of observation will be developed in Kuby (forthcoming).
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focus on the first one by offering a systematic reconstruction; once the first claim is estab-
lished, the second is quite apparent. To make a more precise case for the second claim,
however, systematic similarities only go so far and I will supplement the discussion with a
few remarks concerning the development of Feyerabend’s PTO.27
3. A pragmatic theory of observation in the 1930s protocol
sentence debate
3.1 The detector model of protocol sentences
At the center of a systematic reconstruction of Carnap’s causal theory of observation lies
the detector model, which he first introduces as a particular example (Carnap 1932c, 127–
8; cf. Carnap 1959, 183–5). Let a body be called a detector (“Detektor”) iff it reacts to
a physical event in the surrounding environment with some other physical event. If the
correlation is stable enough, i.e. if the first event plays a causal role in bringing about a
certain reaction, the latter functions as an indicator (“Anzeichen”) of the former. Carnap
introduces the example of a body which increases its electrical conductance when impinged
with a certain illuminant. This is a detector of said illuminant. We do not know the body’s
internal structure (“Innenbau”) and so cannot yet explain its behavior. Still, we can make
reliable inference with regard to illuminants (and even, as a proxy, to other processes, e.g. a
distinct photochemical reaction triggered by the illuminant, but which is hard to ascertain
by itself) by checking the raised conductance level (1932c, 127).
27Does this informative result vindicate Feyerabend’s claim that Carnap’s proposal was essentially what
his own PTO amounted to? I will give some textual evidence to this end, but in order to judge the degree
of similarity between this theory and Feyerabend’s PTO one needs a full account of the latter. I suggest
that, following a HOPOS-driven approach, the systematic question can be investigated as a historical, ge-
nealogical question: ‘Is Feyerabend’s PTO a development of Carnap’s?’ which will be carried out in Kuby
(forthcoming).
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Carnap notes that the specific example can bewidened into amore generalmodel: “Whether
the detector is organic or inorganic is irrelevant to the epistemological issue involved.”
He explains:
The function of the detector is basically the samewhether we are dealing with a
physical detector of specific sorts of illuminant or with a tree-frog as a detector
of certain meteorological states of affairs or (if one may believe the newspa-
pers) with a sniffing dog as a detector of certain human diseases. People take a
practical interest in meteorological forecasts. Where barometers are not avail-
able they may, consequently, use a tree frog for the same purpose. But let us
be clear about the fact that this method does not determine the state of the tree
frog’s soul [Seelenzustand], but a physically specified weather condition, even
if one cannot describe this condition in terms of the concepts of systematized
physics. (Carnap 1959, 184)
The ingenious move on Carnap’s side is to subsume the human case under this model, i.e. to
argue that the epistemological situation is one and the same in the case of a specific class of
organic detectors, namely, human observers: a protocol sentence produced by an observer
is nothing but a specific verbal reaction of a (human) body to some event in its surroundings.
Indeed, the salient point of a protocol sentence is its role as an indicator of some physical
event. To function as an indicator, a correlation between the verbal reaction and a physical
event has to be established. If the correlation is stable enough, i.e. if the event plays a
causal role in bringing about the verbal reaction, then one can use the verbal reaction as an
indicator of that event. In this way, the verbal reactions becomes a “protocol sentence”.
The epistemological situation, whether we are dealing with barometers or with human ob-
servers, is the same. Carnap acknowledges a difference in degrees, but not in principle
(Carnap 1959, 184; cf. Carnap 1932c, 129).
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3.2 Physicalization
The first step towards a causal characterization of protocol sentences was the hard won
physicalist insight that all there is to a protocol sentence, even the one expressing subjec-
tive experiences, is exhausted by its physical interpretation—lest it become inaccessible
to intersubjective testing (Carnap 1932a). Here the development of the notion of physical-
ization (“Physikalisierung”) is key for tracing how the logical-empiricist causal theory of
observation (sentences) came about.
InUniversalspracheCarnap still introduces protocol sentences as “statements belonging to
the primitive protocol” (Carnap 1934b, 44), characterized by subjective access to the given
and the presence of “qualitative determinations” (Carnap 1934b, 45), yet each and every
protocol sentence can also be translated into a sentence of the physical language. A physical
language consists of sentences “of the simplest form” (Carnap 1934b, 52) which “express a
quantitatively determined property of a definite position at a definite time” (Carnap 1934b,
52–53). Physicalization consists in the correlation of (a class of) physical determinations to
certain qualitative determinations. Carnap gives an account of how such a correlationworks
for different situations (Carnap 1934b, 60–65): a subject S can ascertain under which physi-
cal determinations she experiences a certain qualitative determination (personal determina-
tion); a subject S1 (e.g. a psychologist) can ascertain under which physical determination a
subject Si (e.g. a test subject) experiences a certain qualitative determination (determination
by other persons); further, subjects S1, S2, … (e.g. different psychologists) can ascertain
under which physical determinations a subject Si (e.g. a test subject) experiences a certain
qualitative determination (determination on other persons made by several experimenters).
“To experience” is an expression in the material mode of speech. Expressed in the formal
mode, a subject S ascertains which physical determinations are correlated with a protocol
sentence of a test subject Si containing a qualitative determination. (The same holds for
the other two situations.) Most interestingly, Carnap immediately addresses the question
of how such correlation is possible: “That determinations of this kind are always possi-
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ble in principle is due to the fortunate circumstance, an empirical fact, not at all necessary
in the logical sense, that [formal mode:] the protocol [or, material mode:] the content
of experience has a certain ordered configuration [Ordnungsbeschaffenheit]. This reveals
itself in the fact one can build a physical language in such a fashion that qualitative deter-
minations in protocol language are single-valued functions of the numerical distribution of
coefficients of physical states” (Carnap 1934b, 61, revised translation; cf. Carnap 1932a,
445).
Note that Carnap explicitly adduces an empirical happenstance to explain the possibility
of such a correlation. This was exploited by Schlick to argue that—contrary to Carnap’s
intention—physicalism was not a linguistic thesis, but a plain empirical hypothesis after
all (Friedl 2013, 3:267–8). In the paper at hand Carnap tries to anticipate this objection:
“It must be noted, however, that these facts, though of empirical nature, are of far wider
range than single empirical facts or even specific natural laws. We are concerned here with
a much more general structural property of experience […]” (Carnap 1934b, 65, revised
translation; cf. Carnap 1932a, 447).
Carnap’s otherwise clear language gets notably murky in this passage. The most charitable
reading here is talk of empirical, contingent conditions of possibility. This, indeed, doesn’t
make physicalism per se an empirical hypothesis: just as the existence of a spatial plane
on which physical marks can exhibit a structural pattern doesn’t make the “geometry of the
written pattern” an empirical enterprise, so the contingent existence of a “structuredness
of experience”—expressed in the material mode of speech—does not turn the thesis of
physicalism into an empirical hypothesis.
Unlike the resulting case of logical syntax, however, the resulting procedure of physicaliza-
tion is empirical: “The procedure consists in that S1 varies the physical conditions (e.g. the
combinations of various frequencies of oscillations) and discovers the conditions to which
Si reacts with the protocol statement containing the qualitative determination in question”
(Carnap 1934b, 62, revised translation; cf. Carnap 1932a, 446).
A simple example might be a scientist who manipulates the electromagnetic frequencies in
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the visible spectrum until the test subject utters the protocol sentence: “I see green”. Now
we can correlate the qualitative determination “green” to “a definite combination of frequen-
cies of electromagnetic oscillations” (Carnap 1934b, 59), which becomes the corresponding
physical determination. Note that the protocol sentence here is modelled as a reaction of
the test subject to certain events. In this way, the protocol sentence becomes an indicator
of another physical event. We can now test a hypothesis that makes a prediction containing
the above combination of frequencies of electromagnetic oscillations by checking if the test
subject utters the protocol sentence “I see green” (or, say, if the protocol sentence appears
in her written protocol) when she is exposed to such physical circumstances.
The main feature of this procedure finds its way into the detector model: the connection
between a protocol sentence and what the protocol sentence is an indicator of is now spelled
out in terms of simple causal relations between physical events. This is the first, decisive
step towards a causal characterization of observation.
3.3 Protocol sentences as physical events and as linguistic entities
Spelling out the relation between a protocol sentence and what the protocol sentence is an
indicator of in terms of causal relations between physical events, means that the protocol
sentence itself is, well, a physical event. This prima facie modest proposition is indeed a
major one, for it does not simply claim that such a sentence is also a physical event, but that a
protocol sentence exhausts its indicative function qua physical event (an utterance), not qua
linguistic entity (say, a proposition).28 And, as far as the detector model is concerned, the
indicative function is all there is to define the epistemological function of uttering protocol
sentences.
As Carnap puts it, protocol sentences have to be introduced, at first, not “as scientific sen-
tences, but as scientific facts“. Protocol sentences are utterances, a kind of verbalizing
28Note that this is not the same as its physicalist interpretation. A physicalist interpretation claims a
protocol sentence is about some physical events. The further assertion is that the indicative role is carried out
by the protocol sentence as a physical event, not a linguistic entity.
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behavior, on par with any other kind of behavior. He expands in painstaking detail on this
point while arguing for the fundamental symmetry between introspective reporting and ob-
servation of other experimental subjects:
The introspective statements of a psychologist are not, in principle, to be inter-
preted any differently from the statements of his experimental subjects, which
he happens to be reporting on. […] Further, the statements of an experimental
subject are not, in principle, to be interpreted differently than his other vol-
untary or involuntary movements—though his speech movements may, under
favorable circumstances, be regarded as especially informative. Again, the
movements of the speech organs and of the other experimental subject’s body
parts are not, in principle, to be interpreted differently than the movements of
any other animal […].29 The movements of an animal are not, again in prin-
ciple, to be interpreted any differently than those of a voltmeter […]. Finally,
the movements of a voltmeter are not, in principle, to be interpreted differently
than the movements of a raindrop […]. In all these cases, the issue is basically
the same: from a specific physical sentence, other sentences are deduced by a
causal inference, i.e. with the help of general physical formulas—the so-called
natural laws. (Carnap 1959, 195, revised translation; cf. Carnap 1932c, 140–
1.)
Referring to the problematic state of psychology as a scientific enterprise, Carnap diagnoses
a widespread “confusion of facts in the form of sentences with the sentences themselves
29Earlier in the article, Carnap notes how animal psychology led psychologists to a physicalist attitudewith
regard to human utterances: The proponents of behaviorism were led to their position through their work with
animal psychology. In this domain, where no statements but only inarticulate behavior can be observed, it is
most easy to adopt the right attitude. Sure enough, from this attitude one gets to the correct interpretation of
the statements of [human] experimental subjects, conceiving of these statements as acts of “verbal” behavior,
which are in principle no different from other behavior. (Carnap 1959, 181, revised translation; cf. Carnap
1932c, 124) .
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considered as parts of the system of science” (Carnap 1959, 195). This confusion seems
to stem from the widespread belief that the verbalizing behavior of human detectors (intro-
spective statements in particular) works differently than non-human detectors, in that the
verbalizing behavior of human detectors is indicative of a qualitatively different notion of
experience. This is not the case if we take physicalism seriously:
In using someone’s introspective statement about the state of his own mind
(e.g. A’s statement: “A is excited”), the statement, taken as an acoustic event,
is the indicator; under favorable conditions, which are frequently satisfied in
scientific contexts, the state of affairs referred to is such that it can be described
by a sentence (“A is excited”) of the very same form as the acoustic event
which functions as an indicator of it. […] This similarity in form [Formgle-
ichheit] of the acoustic fact and the scientific sentence which is to be inferred
from it explains the ready development of the confusion and its obstinate per-
sistence. The muddle which this confusion leads to is cleared up as soon as
we realize that here, as in the other cases cited, the issue is only about draw-
ing an inference from an indicator to the state of affairs that is being indicated
[angezeigten Sachverhalt]. (Carnap 1959, 195, revised translation; cf. Carnap
1932c, 141)
The difference between “A is excited” qua acoustic event and “A is excited” qua linguistic
entity, i.e. a syntactically correct (syntaxgemäße) sentence, is paramount to physicalism
and is the second step towards a causal theory of observation.
In Protokollsätze (1932d), Carnap explores this by introducing an inorganic detector, “a
machine which reacts in certain situations by displaying signal-disks. The disks might bear
the numerals ‘1’, ‘2’, etc; instead of this they could also be arbitrary meaningless charac-
ters.” (Carnap 1987, 458; cf. Carnap 1932d, 216.) Through observation one ascertains that
“the two signals ‘1’ and ‘4’ are only jointly visible if it is currently raining lightly outside;
‘1’ and ‘5’ when it is raining hard; […]” (458; cf. 216) etc. and thus constructs a dictionary
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relating the the numerals and meaningless characters, respectively, to one’s environment.
By doing so, “we can translate certain signal combinations into sentences of our language,
e.g., ‘1,5’, into “It is raining hard” (459, cf, 216). Carnap stresses, again, that”whether it
concerns a machine which is so built as to give signals, or any other object exhibiting regu-
lar observable reactions under specified conditions, makes no fundamental difference. […]
Even here we can use the reaction as a signal and construct a system of rules for the trans-
lation of the signals into sentences of our language. Basically the same situation is present
when we find a human who reacts in certain circumstances with specific verbalizations”
(Carnap 1987, 459).
Carnap follows through with the separation by introducing “a man whose speech sounds
do not belong to any known language” (Carnap 1987, 459). Here we can finally appreciate
in full the difference between acoustic event and sentence, for the latter is not of the same
form as the former. In complete accordance with the first example, we may construct a
dictionary by observing the man’s utterances in relation to events in his environment: “The
man says:”re bim” if it is raining lightly; “re bum” if it is raining hard; […]” (Carnap 1987,
459), so that “re bim” translates to “it is raining lightly”; “re bum” translates to “it is raining
hard”, and so on.
The crucial point is that the utterance “re bim” is not (yet) a linguistic statement. It is
treated like a statement once we can translate it into another language: “With the help of
this dictionary we can translate certain sound sequences of the man—we call them then
statements—into sentences of our language […]” (Carnap 1987, 459, emphasis added)
Carnap can bring the point home: “The signals of themachine and the statements of theman
are treated like sentences of a language in that translation rules are constructed for them.
We call them therefore “protocol sentences” of the “protocol language” of the machine or of
the foreign man and distinguish this language from the language of our system. Generally
every observable process (of a machine, of a man or of whatever), for which a translation
rule has been constructed, is valid as a protocol sentence” (Carnap 1987, 459).
The gap between acoustic event and linguistic entity has not been magically bypassed, to
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be sure. Not the acoustic event, but its transformation into another language via translation
rules determines the content of a protocol sentence. As Carnap has tried to show all along,
that “other” language is, ultimately, the physical language.
Most importantly, whether the protocol sentence has meaning is solely determined by syn-
tactical rules, not by (the conditions of) its occurrence. In Psychologie, Carnap introduces
a striking example to explain the difference:
Should unusual, brilliant patterns suddenly appear in the sky—even if they
took the form of letters which seemed to compose a sentence—science could
not comprehend them except by first conceiving them, describing them, and
explaining them (i.e. subsuming them under general causal sentences) as
physical facts. The question whether such an arrangement of symbols consti-
tutes a meaningful sentence must be decided without taking into consideration
whether or not it appears in the sky. If this symbol-arrangement is not a
meaningful sentence beforehand, it cannot become one no matter how bright
an appearance it makes in the sky. Whether a sentence is true or false is
determined by empirical contingencies; but whether a sentence is or is not
meaningful is determined solely by the syntax of language.
It is no different in the case of those acoustic phenomena that are emitted from
the mouths of certain vertebrates. They are first of all facts, physical occur-
rences, and specifically, sound waves of a certain sort. We can, further, also
interpret them as symbols. But whether or not such an arrangement of sym-
bols is meaningful cannot depend on its occurrence as an acoustic phenomenon.
(Carnap 1959, 179–80, revised translation; cf. Carnap 1932c, 122)
This is the second step finding its way into the detector model: if in step one the connec-
tion between a protocol sentence and what the protocol sentence is an indicator of has been
spelled out in terms of causal relations between physical events, we now see that the pro-
tocol sentence works as indicator qua physical event; any additional function, including a
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linguistic function, is independent of the circumstances and specifics of its production.
3.4 Indicators of what?
Up to this point mainly the correlation between a protocol sentence and a distal stimulus (the
thing sensed) has been considered. As Carnap notes though, there are different ways to fix
what the physical event ‘protocol sentence’ is an indicator of30. After internal discussions
with Neurath, Feigl and Hahn, Carnap already acknowledged that, at the bottom, the choice
concerning what a protocol is an indicator of is conventional:
We can distinguish at least five events, Carnap wrote after this meeting: (a)
the thing sensed, e.g. a tree; (b) the retinal impression of the tree; (c) the corre-
sponding trace of that impression in the visual processing part of the brain; (d)
the corresponding intent, in the linguistic centres of the brain, to impart a report
of that impression; and (e) the utterance corresponding to that intent. Whether
we regard (e) as an indicator only for (a), skipping the intervening steps, or
also of all or any of those (and further) intervening steps also, is a matter of
convention, he writes, and will vary according to our purposes. And we can
observe empirically that there is a correspondence between these five steps as
viewed from a subjective point of view and the same steps viewed as a phys-
ical causal chain. (Carus 2007, 244, detailing Carnap’s “Zur phänomenalen
Sprache”, RC 029-17-02)31
As usual, “conventional” doesn’t mean “arbitrary”, but “relative to a specific purpose”. Two
options were mainly considered in physicalism:
30As an aside in Universalsprache, explicitly in Psychologie and Protokollsätze.
31Carus (2007, 244) further observes that “Carnap was clearly on the way to the pragmatic view of the
observation language that later found its context within the new pluralism of ‘On Protocol Sentences’ ”. The
link to pluralism (language-relativity) gives reason to suspect that “pragmatic” may be used in the same
misleading way we already encountered in Oberdan’s paper.
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1. (e)→(a): The utterance of a protocol sentence is an indicator of the distal stimulus.
2. (e)→(c): The utterance of a protocol sentence is an indicator of a particular neuro-
physiological state of the brain.
In Protokollsprache, these two options are distinguished as T-sentences and B-sentences,
respectively, and their relative merits are discussed. Translation rules yielding T-sentences
“lead from protocol sentences to sentences which refer to things in the environment of the
man [i.e. human detector] in question” (Carnap 1987, 460). They are called T-rules. For
example, we may establish that an utterance “re” translates to the T-sentence “It is raining”.
B-sentences, on the other hand, “refer to the momentary state of the body B of the person
in question” (Carnap 1987, 460). Here the utterance “re” is translated into the B-sentence
“The body B is rain-observing”. The B-translation given by Carnap is surprising at first, for
we just stated that the second option identifies the indicated event with a neurophysiological
brain state! To better understand this issue, we have to take a little detour and go back to an
important section of Universalsprache, in which Carnap addresses the converse situation:
not bottom-up (how protocol sentences become part of the physical language), but top-
down: how protocol sentences can be derived from system sentences.32
Carnap notes that the “simplest form of such deduction” of a protocol sentence from phys-
ical sentences obtains if the latter describe the bodily state of the subject (Carnap 1934b,
85). It is true that from a physiological point of view the bodily state is best defined in
terms of “the state of the central nervous system and especially the brain”, but—Carnap
admits—we don’t know enough about to define the physical determination in such a way.
But this is not a show-stopper for we can already read external bodily cues, even if in a
32A fact he establishes beforehand; see (Carnap 1932a, 440): having explained that the “sentences of
the system of science […] are not, in the proper sense of the word, derived from protocol sentences” for
“from no collection of protocol sentences, however many, can [a singular statement] be deduced, but it is in
the most favourable case continually supported by them”, Carnap notices “the deduction is possible but in
the converse direction” (Carnap 1934b, 48–49, emphasis added): protocol sentences can be deduced from
system sentences, which makes it possible to test the theory by checking if the sentence appears in the protocol
or not.
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more primitive way. Let the physical sentence P be “The body S is now red-seeing”. The
bodily state “red-seeing” may correspond to a specific neurophysiological configuration,
which would give the physical determination to physicalize the qualitative determination
“red” occurring in the protocol sentence p “(S sees) red now”. Not having enough phys-
iological knowledge to correlate the qualitative determination with a neurophysiological
state of S, we have nonetheless other bodily cues which can serve as physical determina-
tion, namely, the class of all bodily stimulus-responses that we usually take as indicators to
tell that someone “sees red now”:
Let us, e.g. denote by ‘seeing red’ the particular state of the human body charac-
terized by the fact that certain specified (physical) reactions appear in response
to certain specified (physical) stimuli. (For example, stimulus: word sound
“What do you see now?”, reaction: speech movement “red”; stimulus: word
sound “Point to the color you have just seen on this chromaticity diagram”,
reaction: the finger points to some definite spot on the diagram; etc. Here we
should list all those reactions that we usually regard as distinguishing marks to
tell that someone is “seeing red now”). It is still true that we do not know the
numerical distribution of the physical coefficients which characterize the hu-
man body in this state of “seeing red” but we do know many physical events
which often occur either as cause (e.g. bringing a poppy before the eyes of
the person concerned) or as effect of such a state (e.g. certain speech move-
ments; halting movements under certain conditions.) Hence we can, for one,
recognize that a human body is in that state; secondly, we can gain from it
predictions about further bodily states that can be expected. (Carnap 1934b,
86–87, revised translation, emphasis mine)
This strategy is central for Carnap to counter the objection from the “undeveloped state of
physiological knowledge” (Unbekanntheit der Physiologie): “Our current knowledge of
physiology—especially our knowledge of the physiology of the central nervous system—
is not yet sufficiently advanced to enable us to know to what class of physical conditions
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something like excitement corresponds. Consequently, when today we use the sentence ‘A
is excited,’ we cannot mean by it the corresponding physical state of affairs” (Carnap 1959,
175, revised translation).
While Carnap concedes that we can not translate “the sentence “A is excited” into a sentence
of the form ‘such and such a physico-chemical process is now taking place in A’s body’
(expressed by a specification of physical state variables and by chemical formulae)” just
yet, it does not follow that the sentence does not correspond to a physical state: the sentence
“A is excited” indeed “refer[s] to the physical structure of A’s body—though this structure
can only be characterized by potential perceptions, impressions, dispositions to react in a
specific manner, etc., and not by any specification of state variables. Our ignorance of
physiology can therefore affect only the mode of our characterization of the physical state
of affairs in question. It in no way touches upon the principal point: that sentence [“A is
excited”] refers to a physical state of affairs” (Carnap 1959, 174–5).
This point is repeated time and again, and it applies to inorganic and organic detectors
alike.33
We can now come back to understand the issue about direct and indirect B-translation.
In the ideal case, B-sentences may describe the neurophysiological state of B. However,
the lack of physiological knowledge prevents us, for now, from making this determination.
33In the case of the illuminant detector: This practical application will not be impeded by our ignorance
of the detector’s micro-structure and our inability to explain its reaction in physical terms. In spite of our
ignorance, we can certainly say that the detector isolates a certain physically specified class of illuminants.
The objection that this is not a physical class since we cannot characterize it by a specification of optical state
coordinates but only by the behavior of the detector will not stand. (Carnap 1959, 183) Like the case of our
ignorance of the neurophysiological configuration, in which the class of bodily reactions is already a physical
specification, here the conductance level increase specifies the physical characterization. The point is made
again in the case of sentences containing the psychological concept “excited”, which are content-equivalent
to a physical sentence about a bodily state, “whereby the physical term:”physically-excited” is defined as
a disposition to react under certain circumstances in a specified way: “Under such and such circumstances,
such and such gestures, expressions, actions, and words occur” (Carnap 1959, 193).
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Like the case of “red-seeing”, the bodily state “rain-observing” corresponds to a specific
neurophysiological configuration, which would directly give the physical determination of
the bodily state. Not having enough physiological knowledge to correlate “rain-observing”
with a neurophysiological state of B, we can however investigate the physical events which
occur either as cause (in the environment of B) and as effect (the behavioral dispositions
of B) of such a state. This yields a B-translation that exhaustively characterizes the bodily
state of B in terms of its causal history and its observable behavioral effects.
To be sure, Carnap doesn’t see this behavioral stimulus-reaction characterization as the end
goal. It is a makeshift. Though “there is no difference of kind between the two character-
izations, […] the difference of degree is indeed sufficiently great to give us a motive for
pursuing the empirical investigations which might bring the direct physical characterization
within our grasp” (Carnap 1959, 184). In other words, it is a way to deal with the incom-
plete state of current science—looking towards a less incomplete one.34 On the other hand,
with this investigation Carnap is acknowledging Neurath’s admonition “that what we have
before us is always a mixture of crystals and dirt” and that we have to make do “while the
‘ideal language’ is not available” (Carnap to Neurath, 7 October 1928, p. 1, RC 029-16-01,
cited in Carus (2007), p. 240). For actual use cases, if the B-translation is used, it will be
used in this indirect manner.35
TheB-translation is the third step towards a causal characterization of observation sentences.
After having introduced the physical event ‘protocol sentence’ and shown its indicative
function, we now possess an account of what the protocol sentence is an indicator of.
34As noted by Crawford (2014), the same point was later made again by Feigl (1958) (reprinted in Feigl
(1967)) to the effect that “the progress of the science of psychology will unfold in two stages: an initial
“peripheralist” black-box behaviouristic stage and a later “centralist” neurophysiological stage” (Crawford
2014, 716).
35But note that Neurath agreed with Carnap on the direction of this development in the internal discus-
sion: “([Agreeing] with Carnap): We can already build a macroscopic, purely behavioristic theory; later
its construction may become much easier by the addition of brain processes” (Neurath, “Besprechung über
Physikalismus am 4. März 1931”, RC 029-17-03).
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3.5 Indicative function and reliability
Discussing the merits of the T- and B-translation in Protokollsätze, Carnap explains that
the difference between the two types of translation rules lies in the degree of reliability of
the physical T- and B-sentence thus obtained: “The T-translation is the ordinary one and for
practical life the more suitable, since customarily what matters for us is to learn something
about the environment of B. The B-translation is the more reliable; it is preferred when we
are concerned mainly with certainty, for example, with critical testing. In both cases we use
the statement of our neighbor’s B to enrich our knowledge about the processes (physical,
intersubjectively comprehensible processes) just as we evaluate the statements of the signal
machine for the same purpose” (Carnap 1987, 461).
Why is the T-translation less reliable than the B-translation? Because “observation teaches”
that the T-translation “occasionally yields a false sentence (namely in the cases one usually
characterizes as dream-statements, hallucinatory statements, lies or the like; in our account,
however, we are not yet in possession of these concepts)” (Carnap 1987, 460). It might well
happen that our fellow detector utters “re” when it is not raining, so that the T-translation
“It is raining” is false. On the other hand, according to the B-translation the utterance “re”
does not indicate a distal stimulus, but a bodily state of the detector: “The body S is now
rain-observing”. Ideally, we want to be able to characterize “rain-observing” in terms of
a specific neurophysiological configuration that only obtains e.g. if a proximal stimulus
(cf. step (b) in the causal chain) is in fact present—thus excluding certain types of halluci-
natory statements. Since, as Carnap already explained, the ideal case is hard to come by,
we can increase the indicator’s reliability by letting a detailed causal history and behavioral
description enter the characterization of the bodily state. Thus “rain-observing […] can
perhaps be characterized as being found in certain conditions (namely when it is raining)
or if rainlike audible or visible processes are present, and the eyes or ears of B are in the ap-
propriate relative position to these processes) and as stimulating such and such observable
bodily reactions (e.g., on the appropriate stimulus, perhaps questions, under appropriate
circumstances the statement”re“)” (Carnap 1987, 460).
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We are left with a curious situation: the indicative function of a protocol sentence seems to
be unrelated to the indicator’s reliability and vice versa. This is, indeed, a major feature of
the causal theory of observation for it divorces the indicative function of protocol sentences
from any “intrinsic”, non-physicalist connection between the protocol sentence and the
thing sensed, often associated in metaphysical views with notions of certainty of subjective
experience expressed by the protocol sentence.36
This is the fourth essential step towards a causal characterization of protocol sentences,
complementing the sharp division between the indicative function and the content of a
protocol sentence presented in §3.3.
3.6 Protocol sentences as observation sentences
The observational function of a protocol sentence uttered by S is achieved when we learn
something about the environment of S and not just about the bodily state of S.37 If we want
to learn something about the environment of S, a B-translation seems to miss the mark.
Our goal is to infer a T-sentence from the protocol statement of S. As we have discussed
at length, a protocol sentence p ”A red ball is lying on the table here” may be translated to
a T-sentence, e.g. the physical sentence P1 “On the table lies a red ball (i.e. a ball having
such and such physical properties)” (Carnap 1934b, 92, revised translation; cf. Carnap
1932a, 460). In terms of practical usage, the T-translation is potentially unreliable because
e.g. the ball could be hallucinated while there’s no ball on the table. The unreliability of a
T-translation shows that the indicative function is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
to actually learn something about the environment of S (i.e. we might be actually learning
something about the hallucinatory states of S).
How can we achieve a reliable observation? Carnap shows a way out by offering a more
36More precisely, it shows that any experience of certainty accompanying the indication process is unre-
lated to its reliability.
37”Observation” should not be restricted to the visual sense modality. One of the outcomes of physicalism
is: all that can be intersubjectively communicated is also translatable in other sense modalities.
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refined analysis of the problem. Until now the unreliability has been characterized in prac-
tical terms. In Universalsprache he spells it out in more precise syntactical terms: the
salient point is that p and P1 are not “content-equivalent” (gehaltgleich) (Carnap 1934b,
92; cf. Carnap 1932a, 460), i.e. “mutually deducible.”38 There is no way in which we
can transform p to P1 via syntactical rules. This is a pivotal result. It mirrors the result of
the analysis in §3.4, i.e. that physical events are related to protocol sentences only empiri-
cally (as causal relations), and not logically. Any relation between them is of a contingent,
empirical nature.
The B-translation, instead, yields a B-sentence that is content-equivalent with p, namely,
the physical sentence P2 “The body of S is now in a physical state Z, where Z is defined by
a class of conditions such as: following a stimulus “What do you see”, the speech move-
ment”A red ball on the table” obtains as a reaction; and: after a red ball has been put on the
table and S is in a suitable situation, Z occurs” (Carnap 1934b, 92, revised translation; cf.
Carnap 1932a, 460). We see that the physical interpretation of a protocol sentence refers
to a bodily state Z that is exhaustively characterized by a conditional clause of the form “If
such and such, then p” (Carnap 1959, revised translation, p. 92; cf. Carnap 1932c, 139).39 If
an inference from P2 to P1 ought to succeed, the physical event “expressed” by P1 has to be
among the empirical circumstances listed in the antecedent of the conditional clause. (The
physical event P1 is among the empirical circumstances causing the production of p, just as
the utterance of p is one among many possible physical events caused by the physical event
38Cf. Carnap (1934b), p. 91: “[T]he content of a sentence is constituted by the possibility of deducing
further sentences from it; if for any two sentences one can deduce the same further sentences, the two sentence
under consideration have the same content […], as “[t]he metalogical term “content-equivalent” is defined
as “mutually deducible” (Carnap (1934b, 87, revised translation); cf. Carnap (1932a, 458). See also (Carnap
1934a, 38)).
39In Universalsprache Carnap clearly states that physical sentences in the form of a B-sentence allows
the “simplest form” of deduction of a protocol sentence and most importantly, that “all other deductions are
more complicated and can be reduced to this case” (Carnap 1934b, 85). Yet in Protokollsätze he portrays the
T-translation and B-translation as equivalent, implying that there’s no ranking in terms of reducing one to the
other.
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P1.) Only then, as Carnap says, “P1 can be inferred from P2 under appropriate conditions,
by using Z and suitable natural laws” (Carnap 1934b, 92, revised translation; Carnap 1932a,
460). The inference of P1 from P2 is “an inference from an effect to an habitual cause, as
is common in physics and in everyday life” (Carnap 1934b, 92, revised translation; Carnap
1932a, 460). In other words, a reliable indicative function of p is only accessible through a
statement about the bodily state Z of the test subject S uttering p when connected to a causal
account of the empirical circumstances leading to the production of p. And the indicator is
only as reliable as the causal account defining Z is, which is an empirical matter.
We see: as far P1 is concerned, the B-translation offers no shortcut to remedy the
T-translation’s unreliability. But it offers a better analysis of the empirical nature of relia-
bility and, thus, it gives an indication of what is involved in actually learning something
about the environment of S through a protocol sentence uttered by S.
Carnap concludes: “The usual interpretation of a protocol sentence as referring to a certain
state of the subject’s surroundings is really an indirect interpretation, consisting of the actual
interpretation (as referring to the bodily state) and a causal inference [relating the bodily
state to the subject’s surroundings] (Carnap 1934b, 93, revised translation; Carnap 1932a,
460)40.
This concise statement summarizes the pragmatic characterization of observation on Car-
nap’s side.
40Uebel (2007, 253) argues that “what physical things [Carnap and Neurath] took the protocols to be
speaking of” were different: “for Carnap, it was states of the bodies of protocollists, for Neurath, the states of
bodies of protocollists in their relation to their environment.” In light of the characterization above, I submit
that Carnap was here more “Neurathian” than Uebel portrays. While Uebel’s description of Carnap’s position
is correct if the direct B-translation is taken at face value, it is not with respect to the indirect B-translation.
From the vantage point of the latter, a protocol is indeed about “the state of the bodies of protocollists in their
relation to their environment”, as Uebel puts it, because in the indirect B-translation the characterization of
the bodily state of the protocollists is defined by the conditional clause including a detailed account of exactly
such a relation.
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3.7 A pragmatic theory of observation sentences as a solution to the “basis
problem”
In his subsequent article Erwiderung auf die vorstehenden Aufsätze von E. Zilsel und K.
Duncker (1932b), Carnap spells out the radical consequences of a causal characterization
of observation sentences with regard to the “basis problem”. Answering Zilsel’s query
on how we can go about discerning the “ ‘true’ protocol sentences” and related system(s)
of science, Carnap agrees that “no such discernment is possible by purely logical means
[…]” and that “the ‘real system’ (including protocol sentences) has no formal distinguished
status” (Carnap 1932b, 179, my translation, emphasis added). Wemay, however, reinterpret
Zilsel’s question—Carnap continues—as an empirical (historical, sociological) question
about which set of protocol sentences and which scientific system is actually in use among
scientists at a particular time and place. This way, a distinction is possible. Indeed, “there is
no distinction for ‘our’ scientific system apart from a historical distinction establishing that
the latter is the scientific system of our cultural background [Kulturkreis]” (Carnap 1932b,
180, my translation).
Alternatively, and more appropriately in my view, Carnap interprets Zilsel’s query as a
“methodological question: ‘Which rule [Vorschrift] should one go by to formulate a ‘cor-
rect’ protocol sentence?”’ (Carnap 1932b, 181, my translation). Carnap’s laconic answer:
“There is no such rule, because such a rule would be trivial, e.g. “If you have toothaches,
say ‘toothaches’ ” (Carnap 1932b, 182, my translation). An “original” language-learning
mechanism (not via translation to another language) is not set up via rules, but imparted via
“practical measures”:
Just as one can teach a child with examples and handholding how to spit out
cherry pits, so one can habituate him (as a “conditioned reaction”, as behav-
ioral psychologists call it) to say “this house is tall” or “I have toothaches”.
If the pupil verbally reacts like us (i.e. he says “the house is red” when the
house is red), we call him “correctly speaking”. The protocol sentences of
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those “speaking correctly” will be used by the scientific community also in
those cases where we can’t (like the house example) check the correctness im-
mediately. The formation of protocol sentences doesn’t involve pure, but
descriptive semantics; in the usual classification: not logic, but zoology,
i.e. physics. Here there’s talk not only of sentence structures, but of those
sentences themselves as physical shapes [Gebilde]. From the viewpoint of
logic one can only connect sentences (more precisely: sentence structures)
with other sentences; from the viewpoint of physics, on the other hand, we
can describe how sentences as speech movements are formed under certain
conditions, or we can advance stipulations on their formation. (Carnap 1932b,
182–3, my translation, emphasis added).
In a radical move the “basis problem” is reduced to a problem regarding the formation of
protocol sentences and, from there, to an issue of behavioral training. This is unapologet-
ically recognized by Carnap: “The whole system of science rests in the end on sentences
(namely, protocol sentences) which are not formed via logical operations, but through a spe-
cific practical procedure, through trained reactions” (Carnap 1932b, 183, my translation).
Systematically speaking, this empirical vantage point allows us to discern at least two ways
to put the detector model to use: we can use detectors by either describing existing reactions;
or, if the reactions are not hardwired, we can change existing reactions. In the case of
the “machine which reacts in certain situations by displaying signal-disks” (Carnap 1987,
458; cf. Carnap 1932d, 216.), we can describe the dials in relation to the environment and
construct a translation such that ‘1’ and ‘4’ indicates “It is raining”; or, if we have access
to the dials, we can change them by directly displaying the words ‘It is raining’ in the
appropriate situation. The same holds for the “man whose speech sounds do not belong
to any known language” (Carnap 1987, 459). We ascertain that he utters “re bim” if it is
raining lightly; we may change his conditioned reaction to say “It is raining lightly” instead
of “re bim” in the same situation.
Let’s extend this reasoning to the scientific case: a simple voltmeter moves a pointer across
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a scale. We can change and tune the pointer to move in proportion to the voltage and add
the word “volt” next to each point of the scale. We can change the voltmeter from an analog
to a digital interface displaying the words “There is a potential difference of … volts in the
electrical circuit now”. We may even add a speech synthesizer to utter those words.
The same holds for an organic detector: we may find a human detector consistently saying
“My tongue is tingling” when pressing a battery against the tip of her tongue. We may then
change her verbal behavior to utter the words “There is an electric potential difference” in
the same situation. If the tingling increases in proportion to the voltage, she may be trained
to utter words containing qualitative (“There is a low potential difference”) or quantitative
(“The potential difference is 5 volt”) indications. This situation can be complicated at will to
describe actually occurring observation processes in science: a scientist uttering the words
“5 volts” when the pointer of the voltmeter shows “5 volts” on the scale is just a further
conditioned reaction and a further physical event in the causal chain. Adding even more
complexity, a scientist may also be her own detector (cf. Carnap (1959), p. 184.) Sure
enough, whether we want to interpret the scientist’s utterance as an indicator that such an
indication appeared on the voltmeter or as an indicator that there was a potential difference
of 5 volts in the electric circuit is a matter of convention, depending e.g. on whether we
are calibrating the voltmeter or making a reading of the circuit. Indeed, most scientific
observations involve multiple causally-linked detectors—last, but not least, the scientist
herself.
The last example shows a third way to approach the detector model: if the detector is sus-
ceptible to new, variable inputs (if it can detect new physical events in the surrounding
environment), one can train new reactions (what Carnap calls “original” (ursprüngliches)
language-learning). Most of the conditioned reactions relevant to the scientific community
are not part of the generally available bodily dispositions of human observers. Scientific
observation is chiefly dependent on the training of new and reliable reactions, imparted via
practical measures, to new physical events.
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4. Feyerabend’s PTO in light of Carnap’s detector model
Feyerabend’s own contribution to a pragmatic theory of observation was first developed in
his dissertation (1951), in which he proposed a forerunner of PTO he called a “theory of
reactors” (Theorie der Reaktoren) (Feyerabend 1951, 60, my translation). Here he would
begin where Carnap left off: to “study how sentences as speech movements are formed un-
der certain conditions” and to “advance stipulations on their formation”, as Carnap (1932b,
180) envisaged. (In his paper (1958), Feyerabend would first publish a short—and much
abridged—summary of the stipulative task only.41)
In the dissertation, the Theorie der Reaktoren is explicitly presented as an “empirical the-
ory, which resembles in many ways a theory of thermometers” (Feyerabend 1951, 60, my
translation), in complete agreement with Carnap’s account. Feyerabend’s “reactor” is ev-
idently a synonym for Carnap’s “detector”. Feyerabend’s theory models observers as re-
actors (viz. detectors), measuring devices which react in a certain way under certain con-
ditions. Already in this early model, the utterance (more generally: the production) of
protocol sentences is one of the possible observer’s behavioral patterns, which are causally
determined by the observer’s surrounding environment.
Feyerabend’s model gives an empirical theory for the basic empiricist tenet that an (ap-
propriately calibrated) detector tells us something not just about its own state, but also
about what is detected in its surroundings. What it tells us, however, is rather minimal:
that something exists. That is the most the detector model can achieve. It can tell us that
something exists, but not what exists. But this limitation is not a disadvantage. Indeed,
one of the features of PTO, which we have detailed in §3.3 and that Feyerabend took to
heart, is that it sharply distinguishes between the indicative function (i.e. that something
exists) and the linguistic function of an observation sentence—its interpretation (i.e. what
41This part would eventually reappear briefly as the conception of “quickly decidable sentences” in
Maxwell (1962), p. 13. But note that Feyerabend already presented the pragmatic characterization in print
beforehand, cf. Feyerabend (1954), p. 471, recently translated as Feyerabend ([1954] 2015).
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exists), and that the latter cannot be derived from the former. Later, Feyerabend (1958,
145) tracks this sharp separation by distinguishing between “sentences” (Carnap’s “acous-
tic events”) and “statements” (Carnap’s “syntactically correct sentence”). Here the terms
“observation-sentence” and “observation-statement” are used to specify the respective con-
ditions for the uninterpreted and the interpreted status of a detector’s indication: “[T]he
pragmatic conditions concern the relation between observation-sentences (not statements)
and human beings without making any stipulation as to what those sentences are supposed
to assert. Further conditions will have to be added if we want to obtain a fully-fledged
language. Any complete class of such further conditions will be called an interpretation.
A particular observation-language is completely specified by its characteristic [i.e. the set
of pragmatic conditions] together with its interpretation. The distinction between the prag-
matic properties of a language and its interpretation is clear and unambiguous” (Feyerabend
1958, 145–6).
The ‘epistemological’ lesson that Feyerabend’s PTO inherits from Carnap’s account of ob-
servation sentences is that while the stipulations of the logical syntax make protocol sen-
tences meaningful, they cannot discern whether a particular sentence is a protocol sentence.
Only a detailed empirical account of the causal chain—viz. the conditioning procedure
(resulting in a list of “pragmatic conditions”)—can establish the causal role of a physical
event in the production of a verbal reaction, in which case we call it a “protocol sentence”.
(In case of protocols sentences indicating some physical event in detector’s surroundings,
we may call them “observation sentences”.) Or, in Feyerabend’s words, which we are now
able to fully understand: “an observation sentence is distinguished from other sentences
of a theory not by its content, but by the cause of its production, by the fact that its pro-
duction conforms to certain behavioral patterns” (Feyerabend 1962, 36). Conversely, no
conceptual analysis of the detector’s verbal reaction, or even of the detector qua physical
system, however detailed that analysis may be, will give us any indication as to whether
the observation sentences are meaningful or not, nor what their meaning is.
It may be appropriate here to dwell on the last point a little longer: Like Carnap’s detector
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model, PTO leaves completely open the question of howwe can establish what the meaning
of observation sentences is. Feyerabend would eventually propose an answer by introduc-
ing his “thesis I”, according to which “the interpretation of an observation language is
determined by the theories that we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as
soon as those theories change” (Feyerabend 1958, 163).
But this proposal, thesis I, is independent from PTO. Contrary to Oberdan’s contention that
thesis I is the “first idea” of PTO and that the causal account follows from it (cf. §2.1),
the question of meaning is not part of (or answered by) a pragmatic theory of observation.
A case in point: Carnap’s answer, a syntactical deflation of meaning, differs from Feyer-
abend’s. It is notoriously difficult to give a precise account of the scope of Carnap’s syntax,
because his notion of syntax includes elements of—what he would later call—semantics.
In any case, “interpretation” is not a syntactical term in 1932. Here the very translation of
a protocol sentence into a physicalist language would make the protocol meaningful—and
the meaning would be given by the syntactical rules of the language. In Feyerabend’s case,
thesis I is sometimes identified with his “contextual theory of meaning”: “the meaning of
every term depends upon the theoretical context in which it occurs. Words do not ‘mean’
something in isolation: they obtain their meanings by being part of a theoretical system”
(Feyerabend 1965a, 180).42
But whether this identification stands up to scrutiny is a matter of debate.43
To be sure, Feyerabend is not innocent inmuddying thewaters, as he presents time and again
PTO and thesis I in conjunction. But this should be interpreted, I submit, as the notion that
PTO enables thesis I in two ways: it leaves open the question of how the interpretation of
observation sentences arises, so that thesis I can be introduced at all; and it gives a negative
answer to competing solutions: the “pragmatic” principle of meaning, which would locate
the interpretation at the pragmatic level PTO is concerned with, identifying the meaning
of an observation sentence with its linguistic use; and the “phenomenological” principle
42But see already Feyerabend (1962), p. 88.
43See Oberheim (2006, 58–63) for a thorough discussion of the relation between the two.
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of meaning, according to which meaning is determined by what “the given”, the sort of
introspective capacity in the content of experience that the physicalist turn had rejected.44
And, indeed, we observe in Feyerabend’s writings that the choice of thesis I over alternative
accounts of meaning is not uniquely determined by assuming PTO. This choice is argued by
Feyerabend affirmatively by appeal to epistemic and even ethical norms, which—according
to him—should compel us to assume thesis I over alternative accounts.
Finally, Feyerabend not only developed further Carnap’s detector model, but also applauded
Carnap’s contribution as a decisive step in the development of empiricism. As he later
remarks:
In the case of measuring instruments, the pragmatic theory degenerates into
a triviality: nobody would ever dream of asserting that the way in which we
interpret the movement of, say, the hand of a voltmeter is uniquely determined
either by the character of this movement itself or by the processes inside the in-
strument; […] Taken by themselves the indication of instruments do not mean
anything unless we possess a theory which teaches us what situations we are
to expect in the world, and which guarantees that there exists a reliable corre-
lation between the indications of the instrument and such a particular situation.
(Feyerabend 1962, 36–37)
It is its extension to human observers that is novel—and bold. This is, I argue, the main
advance that Feyerabend looked up to: Carnap dispenses with what Feyerabend calls the
“assumption that human observers are something special and cannot be treated in the same
manner as physical measuring instruments” (Feyerabend 1962, 38) that had survived in
empiricism for so long and that the pragmatic theory of observation finally dealt with: “It
is not easy to set down in a few lines the reasons for this exceptional treatment of human
44This terminology was explicitly introduced in Feyerabend (1958, 149). But the notion was already
central in Feyerabend’s unpublished dissertation (1951), were it was discussed under the heading “subjective
theory of basic statements”.
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observers. Nor is it possible to criticize them thoroughly and thereby fully pave the way
for the acceptance of the pragmatic theory of observation. However, such a comprehensive
criticism is not really necessary here. It was partly given by those very same philosophers
who are responsible for the formulation of the pragmatic theory (Footnote: Cf. Carnap
1932a; Carnap 1932c) (which most of them dropped later on, their own excellent arguments
in favor of it notwithstanding)” (Feyerabend 1962, 37–38).
This resonates quite nicely with Carnap’s remarks about the “the emotional resistance to the
thesis of physicalism” while discussing the many objections advancing other (non-physical)
interpretations of protocol sentences:
Such resistance is always exerted against any thesis when an Idol is being de-
throned by it, when we are asked to discard an idea with which dignity and
grandeur are associated. As a result of Copernicus’ work, man lost the distinc-
tion of a central position in the universe; as a result of Darwin’s, he was de-
prived of the dignity of a special supra-animal existence; as a result of Marx’s,
the factors by means of which history can be causally explained were degraded
from the realm of ideas to that of material events; as a result of Nietzsche’s, the
origins of morals were stripped of their halo; as a result of Freud’s, the factors
bymeans of which the ideas and actions of men can be causally explained were
located in the darkest depths, in man’s nether regions. (Carnap 1959, 167; cf.
Carnap 1932c, 110)
5. Concluding remarks on “disinfected empiricism”
In this article, I reconstructed Carnap’s detector model of observation sentences as an in-
stance of a pragmatic theory of observation, taking my cue from an incidental remark by
Feyerabend to the effect that such a theory had been developed by leading Logical Empiri-
cists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. I first proceeded to dispel a misun-
derstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Oberdan. As used by Feyerabend,
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this adjective does not refer to the conventional nature of the noun it modifies. Instead,
it refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and their environment
describable by empirical means (specifically, the causal relation between verbal behavior
of language users and their environment). This usage of the term “pragmatic” is also in line
with Morris’ and Carnap’s use. Secondly, I agreed with Oberdan’s claim that no pragmatic
theory of observation (in the misunderstood sense) can be found in Carnap. But, building
on the intended meaning of “pragmatic”, I reconstructed how a pragmatic theory of obser-
vation sentences can indeed be found in Carnap’s writings. In particular, I sketched such
theory by reconstructing it in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences
as bodily dispositions indicating some physical events in the surroundings of the detector.
Finally, I showed how Feyerabend’s PTO picks up central features of Carnap’s account and
also shares some of the same motivations.
A few concluding remarks on empiricism are in order. Feyerabend gives a specific reading
of Carnap’s account as a crucial step to a “disinfected empiricism”; in fact, “the empiri-
cism of the thirties was disinfected in the sense desired here” (Feyerabend 1962, 31). I take
Feyerabend to give a specific interpretation of this move, in which the notion of “experi-
ence” relevant to knowledge is divested from any subjectivist interpretation or subjective
grounding. Historically, this new conception had resulted from the radical physicalist un-
derstanding of experience that Neurath initiated and Carnap accepted without reservation.45
45I do not think that Carnap’s favorable remarks on “methodological solipsism” at his physicalist peak
offers a refutation of this point. Instead, our reading gives an interpretation of his remarks that make Neurath’s
concerned objections on this point groundless. In short: Carnap’s remarks do not entail a privileged epistemic
vantage point of first-person accounts. More than a proposal, his “methodological solipsism” is an observation
of a contingent fact: detectors play different roles in the causal chain. The obvious analogy would be the
difference between human observers and thermometers. Both are detectors, but it is humans who deliver an
interpretation of the thermometer’s indication, not the other way around. But this is based on the contingent
fact that inorganic detectors do not provide their own syntactical rules. If thermometers were able to construct
their own syntactical rules, the specific difference with human observers would cease to exist. In the same
way, the processing of the output of other detectors hinges, contingently, on one’s own ability to be part
of the causal chain and these outputs become inputs only if they are processed by one’s own self, which
44
It was certainly an expression of an “epistemology without a knowing subject”. In partic-
ular, no experiential faculties of the human observer are the justificatory endpoint for the
“basis problem”. But, crucially, and in contrast to Popper, Feyerabend reminds us that it
was after all an epistemology with a ‘knowing object’, as it were: from the fact that human
observers and their faculties cannot serve as justificatory endpoints, it does not follow that
they ought to be thrown out of the equation, as is the case in Popper’s idealistic flight into
World Three. A (generalized) anti-psychologistic attitude exhorts us not to conflate logical
problems with empirical ones, but this—in Carnap’s case—goes both ways.46 From the fact
that the “basis problem” can be stated in clear terms and that there is no logical grounding
to its solution (i.e. that it cannot be solved my means ofWissenschaftslogik), it follows that
the grounding is empirical. And this means, from a logical-empiricist vantage point, that
the sciences become part of the solution to the “basis problem” in equal measure. If human
agents are observers only insofar as (and as much as) any other measuring instrument can
be, a theory of measuring instruments is the solution to the basis problem we are seeking.
We come to see that our reading of Carnap on protocol sentences in 1932, as prompted
by Feyerabend’s “disinfected empiricism”, reveals a Carnap perfectly willing to support a
bootstrapping explanation of the empirical basis of the sciences by recourse to the methods
and results of empirical science.
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